

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01647 281114Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 OMB-01 ACDA-12 TRSE-00 SSM-03 HA-05 /093 W
-----011582 281240Z /14

R 271541Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7295
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 1647

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR UN LE IS MOPS
SUBJ: THE SITUATION IN LEBANON: CONVERSATION WITH DANY CHAMOUN

1. DCM CALLED ON DANY CHAMOUN AT PNL PARTY HEADQUARTERS ON MARCH 25. WHILE WAITING FOR DANY TO ARRIVE, HIS STAFF POINTED OUT THREE SYRIAN ADF POSITIONS ON ROOFS OF NEARBY BUILDINGS, WITH GUNS POINTED AT PNL. IN ADDITION TO COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH CHRISTIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON (REPORTED BEIRUT 1646), DANY MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

2. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. DANY SAID "ALL LEBANESE" WERE PLEASED THAT ISRAELIS HAD ATTACKED PALESTINIANS AND HE REGRETTED ONLY THAT THEY HAD NOT MOVED FASTER AND TAKEN TYRE. HE HAD HEARD THERE WERE STILL 1,000 PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN AND AROUND TYRE (A FIGURE HE THOUGHT WAS TOO HIGH). HE DID NOT KNOW HOW FRENCH WERE GOING TO CONTROL THEM OR PREVENT UNARMED PALESTINIAN MEN FROM RETURNING TO TYRE AND REARMING THEMSELVES FROM THE MANY HIDDEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01647 281114Z

ARMS CACHES THERE. DANY SAID HE THOUGHT ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY STAY IN SOUTH LEBANON FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. DCM SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD LEAVE MUCH SOONER. DANY SAID THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 100,000 LEBANESE REFUGEES FROM THE SOUTH AND MENTIONED THAT THE CHRISTIANS HAD ALLOWED SOME OF THE LEBANESE SHIA TO RETURN TO NEBA. HE REMARKED THAT "NO LEBANESE SHOULD BE WITHOUT A ROOF OVER HIS HEAD."

3. THE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE ARMY (LAF). DANY NOTED THAT SEVERAL OF THE LAF OFFICERS WHO WERE RECENTLY REMOVED FROM THEIR POSTS WERE CLOSE FRIENDS OF HIS BUT HE HAD NOT COMPLAINED. THE ESSENTIAL WAS THAT SARKIS AND KHOURY PICK COMMANDERS THEY COULD TRUST AND WERE LOYAL TO THEM AND GET THE ARMY REORGANIZED AND INTO THE FIELD. HE SAID THAT THE ARMY MUST BE EXPANDED IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT SECTARIAN BALANCE. THERE WERE 2,000 MOSLEMS WHO COULD BE ENROLLED IMMEDIATELY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL CHRISTIANS LATER. HE SUGGESTED THAT A TWO-THREE THOUSAND MAN FORCE BE PUT TOGETHER QUICKLY AND SENT TO NABATIYAH, SUPPORTED BY AN ADF UNIT. SINCE THE ISRAELIS OBJECTED TO THE SYRIANS GOING TO NABATIYAH, AND THE SUDANESE, SAUDI AND UAE CONTINGENTS EITHER COULDN'T OR WOULDN'T FIGHT THE PALESTINIANS, DANY SAID HE HOPED 1,5000(##)MOROCCANS COULD BE ADDED TO THE ADF FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS FORCE COULD GO THROUGH THE UPPER SHUF (WHICH WOULD PLEASE WALID JUMBLATT, HE THOUGHT), THUS AVOIDING TROUBLES WITH THE PALESTINIANS ALONG THE COAST AND IN THE LOWER BEKAA. ONCE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN REESTABLISHED IN NABATIYAH, IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO CONTROL BOTH MAJOR HADDAD AND THE PALESTINIANS. DANY MENTIONED THAT, IN ADDITION TO U.S. AID, BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SAUDIS HAD OFFERED EQUIPMENT TO THE LAF SO MATERIEL WAS NO PROBLEM (ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT A FEW MORE TANKS AND SOME HELICOPTERS WERE NEEDED). WHAT WAS LACKING WAS THE WILL TO GET THE LAF INTO ACTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01647 281114Z

4. IN THE REGION TO BE CONTROLLED BY UNIFIL, DANY SAID THE GOL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY SEND 200 ADDITIONAL POLICEMEN AND GENDARMES TO TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC ORDER. HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO A TOTAL OF 10,000 FOR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. ONLY WITH SUCH A FORCE, SUPPORTED BY AN ARMY OF ABOUT 30,000 MEN, WOULD LEBANON BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN SECURITY.

5. RELATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS. DANY SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED WITH SAUDI AMBASSADOR ALI CHAER, WHO WAS WORKING HARD TO KEEP THINGS UNDER CONTROL. ALI CHAER HAD ASKED HIM TO TALK TO THE PALESTINIANS BUT HE HAD DECLINED, SINCE HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY TO THEM. HE REALIZED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO TALK NOW ABOUT GETTING THE PALESTINIANS OUT OF LEBANON, BUT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT THE ARMED PALESTINIAN PRESENCE. UNTIL THE PALESTINIANS WERE READY TO STORE THEIR ARMS IN THE CAMPS AND LEAVE THEM THERE, THERE WAS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT.

6. SHIA-CHRISTIAN COOPERATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. DANY AGREED THAT SHIA-CHRISTIAN COOPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE STABILITY OF SOUTH LEBANON. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE MOST POLITICALLY ACTIVE GROUP AMONG THE SHIA WAS A VIOLENTLY LEFTIST MINORITY OF

ABOUT 15 PERCENT, LED BY FORMER LEBANESE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. THE TRADITIONAL SHIA LEADERS, SUCH AS PNL VICE PRESIDENT KAZIM KHALIL, NO LONGER HAD MUCH INFLUENCE. THE CHRISTIANS WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO SEEK OUT NEW, MODERATE SHIA LEADERSHIP AND WORK WITH THEM. THIS WOULD MAKE KAZIM BEY ANGRY, BUT IT HAD TO BE DONE.

7. COMMENT: AS USUAL, DANY EXPRESSED A PRAGMATIC, REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS, AND SAID HE IS READY TO GIVE PRESIDENT SARKIS HIS FULL SUPPORT IF SARKIS WOULD ACT FORCEFULLY TO ASSERT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOTH THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS IS CAUTIOUS AND CYNICAL; HE IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE SUPPORTING THE CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON FOR THEIR OWN REASONS AND CANNOT BE COUNTED ON IN THE LONG RUN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 01647 281114Z

PARKER

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) AS RECEIVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, COMBAT OPERATIONS, REPRISALS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES, RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BEIRUT01647
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780134-0483
Format: TEL
From: BEIRUT
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780323/aaaaatjb.tel
Line Count: 139
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7ec612bd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3198906
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE SITUATION IN LEBANON: CONVERSATION WITH DANY CHAMOUN
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, UN, UNIFIL, (CHAMOUN, DANY), (LANE, EDWARD)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7ec612bd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014